Abstract-In this letter, we propose a non-cooperative feedback control game for secondary transmitter, where we assume that secondary users are rational and thus selfish, i.e., they will choose the feedback rate to maximize their own utility functions. The utility function of each user is defined as the downlink data-rate minus a linear price function of the channel state information (CSI) feedback rate. The existence of the Nash-equilibrium of the proposed game is analyzed. Also, in order to satisfy the primary user's interference threshold, power control algorithms are proposed. Simulation results show that the sum-rate of the proposed game is better than that of the equally distributed feedback-size scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
N OWADAYS, due to the emergence of high-speed communication, the demand for spectral resources has increased dramatically. On the other hand, the existing spectral utilization can be as low as 15% according to the report of the Federal Communication Commission [1] . Therefore, it is very important to develop efficient methods to manage and share the spectral resources. This motivates the development of Cognitive Radio (CR) [2] - [4] , especially in the underlay CR network, where the secondary users (SUs) can always access the spectrum no matter whether the spectrum is used or not used by the primary users (PUs). However, there is a restriction that the interference received at the PUs due to the secondary transmission should be less than a pre-determined threshold. In the literature, there are many related works such as capacity analysis and secondary transmitter design [5] - [8] .
With multiple antennas as the transmitter, multiple users can be simultaneously served through multiplexing [9] - [12] . To achieve this, CSI at the transmitter is necessary for designing precoding matrix to control inter-user-interference (IUI in frequency division duplexing. However, since the feedback-rate is generally limited, perfect CSI cannot be obtained at the transmitter. Therefore, it is hard to control the IUI perfectly in practice. In the literature, there are many related works such as capacity analysis of secondary links under imperfect CSI [7] , [8] , [13] . Since these works treated each user independently and focused on the multi-user CSI feedback problem from information theory point of view, each SU sends its own CSI to transmitter using equal-sized and fixed feedback bits. However, since there are competitions in effective CSI feedback-rates among SUs under sum feedback-rate constraint, equal-sized CSI feedback model is obviously inefficient. Hence, it will be desirable to sort out the competition by finding an equilibrium in the multiple SUs feedback scenario. To analyze the competition and cooperation behavior in CR network, game theory has been widely used [4] , [14] , [15] . However, most of existing works assume the CSI is perfect and known while in practice the CSI is imperfect due to limited feedback. The most related work is [16] where the authors use game theory to analyze channel feedback for multiple input multiple output (MIMO) system. Nevertheless, it is different from our work since it neither focuses on CR network nor considers sum feedback-rate constraint.
In this letter, we propose a non-cooperative feedback control game for secondary transmitter design under sum feedback-rate constraint. In the proposed game, the utility function of a SU is determined by the downlink data-rate and CSI feedback size. Since SUs are rational and thus selfish, they will determine the feedback-rate by maximizing their own utility functions under the sum feedback-rate constraint. By analyzing the proposed game, we discuss the existence of the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we propose power control algorithms to guarantee the interference threshold at the PUs. Simulation results show that the sum-rate of the proposed game is better than that of the equally distributed feedback size scheme. Furthermore, with the proposed power control algorithms, the interference restriction at the PUs is guaranteed under imperfect PUs' channel condition.
Throughout the letter, we use the following notation. Let , , and denote the transpose, pseudo-inverse and the Euclidean norm of vector , respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We consider an underlay CR network with PUs, SUs, and one secondary base station (SB) with ( ) antennas. Similar to [17] , we assume that each SU can perfectly estimate the downlink CSI and send it back to SB using limited feedback under sum feedback rate constraint. Moreover, we assume that there exists cooperative channel feedback between primary user 1070-9908/$31.00 © 2013 IEEE (PU) and secondary base station (SB) [13] . Through the cooperative feedback, the SB can transmit data to SUs and control the interferences to the PUs.
For the -th SU, the transmitted signal, , is precoded by precoding vector from antennas at the SB. Therefore, the received signal at the -th SU can be expressed as (1) where , , and denote the channel vector from the SB to the -th SU, the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) , and the number of selected SUs for transmission, resepctively. The channel is assumed to be Rayleigh flat fading, where the elements of each user's channel vector are independent complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance.
Assuming equal power allocation and zero-forcing (ZF) for precoder design, the sum-rate of the -th SU is given by (2) where denotes the secondary transmit power. Due to the secondary transmission, there is an interference received at the PUs. The interference at the -th PU, , can be written as (3) where , denotes the channel vector from the SB to the -th PU. Notice that must be smaller than a pre-defined threshold to guarantee the quality-of-service of PUs. Also, we assume the quantized CSI can be modeled as [16] (4) where is i.i.d. Gaussian vector with .
III. SECONDARY TRANSMIT POWER CONTROL
Considering equal power allocation and ZF precoding, the maximum interference at the -th primary user can be expressed by (5) where is the feedback rate of the -th PU transmitted from user to SB in order to be satisfied with the interference constraint ( ). Then, the optimal transmit power can be obtained as (6) where (7) and is the maximum secondary transmit power. If , becomes . However, since is finite in practice, the transmit power is controlled.
IV. NON-COOPERATIVE FEEDBACK CONTROL GAME

A. User's Utility Function
To achieve the rate in (2), the -th SU needs to send the quantized CSI back to SB. In other words, the SU needs to pay a certain cost of sending the feedback to achieve the sum-rate. Therefore, the utility function of -th secondary user can be defined as (8) where is the rate the -th SU can achieve when using feedback rate , is a parameter controlling the balance between the gain, , and the cost, . Here we assume a linear cost function.
Since the SB uses the ZF precoder, SU can estimate the interference due to channel feedback error and the beamforming vectors of other users as (9) where is the maximum angle error using the feedbackrate . With , the user can also estimate the desired signal power . Therefore, the can be re-written as follows (10) where As goes to infinite, goes to zero and becomes the optimal precoding vector, which leads to the maximal rate . Note that interference in is independent from other SUs' CSI. Therefore, we can calculate the easily.
B. Game Formulation
Since SUs are naturally selfish, they try to maximize their own utility function in (8) under the sum feedback-rate constraint. We assume that the -th SU has a minimum feedbackrate constraint to guarantee a minimal performance and a maximum feedback-rate constraint to achieve the maximum performance. Obviously, if the sum feedback-rate constraint is able to satisfy all SUs with the maximum feedback-rate , the feedback-rate allocation problem is trivial since the SB just allocates to each SU. The allocation problem becomes more interesting when the sum feedback-rate constraint cannot provide all SUs with the maximum feedback-rate constraint . From the SUs' point of view, they try to maximize their utility function subject to the constraint that the sum of the users' feedback-rate does not exceed the sum feedback-rate . Therefore, the game can be formulated as (11) where denotes the available sum feedback-rate.
C. Analysis of the Game
According to (8) and (10), we can see that the utility function is a concave function in terms of . Therefore, the -th SU achieves its maximal utility at , where is defined as [18] ( 12) with satisfying
Since the optimal is determined by the parameter , the game has different equilibria with different physical meanings for different choices of . Especially, we discuss the Nash equilibrium in three different cases: , , and , where and are the constant satisfying (13) 1) Non-Nash Equilibrium Allocation ( ): In this case, since the , the game cannot achieve the desired Nash equilibrium.
2) Non-Efficient Rate Allocation (
): In this case, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium. However, since , from (19), the sum of the SUs' feedback rate is smaller than , , i.e., the available sum feedback rate is not fully utilized. Therefore, this allocation scheme is not efficient.
3) Efficient Rate Allocation ( ): If , the game has a unique Nash equilibrium which satisfies , i.e., the available sum feedback rate constraint is fully utilized. Therefore, this allocation scheme is efficient. To achieve the efficient Nash equilibrium, we propose a simple algorithm to find the proper as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1:
Algorithm for Non-Cooperative Feedback Control Game -Base station:
1. Set and announce and to all SUs -Each user:
2. Find and report to SB -Base station:
3. If -Increase and announce to all SUs -Go to step 2 Else -Stop and announce .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We compare the proposed game theoretic feedback-rate allocation scheme (GA) with equal feedback-rate allocation scheme (EA) and the optimal feedback-rate allocation scheme (OA) that maximizes the sum-rate. Note that OA does not consider the selfish nature of SUs and thus there is no concept of equilibrium, i.e., SUs may not be willing to follow the strategy obtained by OA.
In Fig. 1 , we show the sum-rate performance under instantaneous channel condition. We can see when the sum feedbackrate increases, the feedback CSI becomes more accurate, which leads to the increase of the sum-rate of all SUs. By dynamically allocating the feedback size, the the proposed GA achieves much better performance compared with EA which equally allocates the feedback size.
In Fig. 2 , we evaluate the performance of sum-rate under different SNR by fixing sum feedback-rate to be 12. We can see that the sum-rates are saturated in high SNR region due to the interference. However, with the efficient feedback-rate allocation, the saturation point of the proposed GA is much higher than that of EA, i.e., the achievable sum-rate of the proposed GA is larger than that of EA.
In Fig. 3 , the average sum-rate performance versus sum feedback-rate is evaluated at for different approaches. We can see that both GA and OA achieve much better performance compared with EA. Note that the OA requires all SUs feedback the SINR to the SB as well as a full search algorithm for the power allocation, which can be very costly. With the proposed GA method, we can achieve similar performance with much lower cost. Moreover, OA does not take into account the selfish nature of SUs. In such a case, selfish SUs will not follow the strategy obtained by OA since they may obtain higher payoffs by deviating. Fig. 4 shows the performance of the proposed scheme with different feedback bits from PUs. When the feedback bits are large, e.g., 10, the transmit power restriction of SUs is loose according to (7) . In such a case, there is little performance degradation compared to the perfect PUs' CSI case. However, if feedback bits are small, due to the secondary transmit power restriction, there is large performance degradation. Therefore, choosing a proper feedback bits from PUs is very important and will be one of our future directions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this letter, the secondary transmitter design based on noncooperative feedback control game is proposed. Through the proposed game, SUs can efficiently determine their own optimal feedback-rate to maximize their own utilities. Simulation results show the advantage of the proposed scheme compared with the equal feedback size scheme. Moreover, we also found that the feedback bits from PUs play an important role in our scheme. Therefore, in the future, we would like to extend our current scheme with fixed feedback bits from PUs to a dynamic scheme where PUs can determine their own feedback bits to maximize their own utilities. 
